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I. INTRODUCTION

For years, large corporations have engaged in business operations in foreign
countries to exploit the natural resources available abroad and to achieve higher
overall profits by operating at costs substantially lower than these businesses would
incur in North America. In the process, citizens of underdeveloped foreign countries
are often subjected to gross abuses of their human rights, suffered at the hands of
large multinational corporations and the host countries’ governments and military
forces. Sadly, this horrific reality still holds true today. People are being tortured,
raped, and killed at the hands of entities that are in many instances funded by these
multinational corporations. Some individuals have had to endure slavery. Others
have had to endure forced impregnation.
Until recently, victims of such heinous crimes have been capable of bringing
claims against corporations under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 1 (“ATS”) in hopes of
receiving a favorable judgment, or, in most instances, a large settlement against the
corporation for the harm suffered. However, in its September 2010 decision Kiobel

†

J.D. 2012, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.
1

28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1940) [hereinafter ATS] (“The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law
of nations or a treaty of the United States”).
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v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the Second Circuit concluded what no other court has:
that corporations are categorically not subject to ATS liability. 2 In Kiobel, Nigerian
residents filed a putative class action under the ATS, claiming that Dutch, British, and
Nigerian corporations engaging in oil exploration and production aided and abetted 3 the
Nigerian government in committing human rights abuses in violation of the law of
nations. The Second Circuit relied on established precedent in holding that customary
international law governs the scope of ATS liability. 4 The court then introduced a new
concept to ATS jurisprudence, holding that corporate defendants are not subject to
liability for any claims brought under the ATS because they are not subjects of
international law.5 This concept is indeed a novel one because other courts have
consistently held that corporations could be liable under the ATS if its conduct did in fact
reach the level of an international law violation. 6
The text of the ATS makes no distinctions as to what class of defendants may be held
liable under the ATS. ATS cases typically yield discussion of whether a specific offense
rises to the level of a violation of the law of nations. In Kadic v. Karadzic, the Second
Circuit was presented with the novel issue of whether courts may exercise ATS
jurisdiction over private individuals (opposed to ATS jurisdiction over governmental or
state actors only).7 The Kadic court ultimately held that the ATS does apply to private
individuals because some offenses violate international law, regardless of who committed
them.8 Challenges to subject matter jurisdiction arise in many, if not all, ATS cases
involving corporations. When presented with such challenges, courts have consistently
exercised jurisdiction over corporations when plaintiffs allege the corporation

2

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 145 (2d Cir. 2010).

3

Aiding and abetting is and has been a common mechanism for courts to exercise jurisdiction
under the ATS over private individuals and corporations by establishing a relationship between
the individual or corporation and a state actor committing human rights violations against the
plaintiffs. I will, however, discuss the concept of aider and abettor liability and its applicable
standard later in this article. See generally Doug Cassel, Corporate Aiding and Abetting of
Human Rights Violations: Confusion in the Courts, 6 NW. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 304 (2008);
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 260-264 (2d Cir. 2009),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 79 (2010) and cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 122 (2010).
4
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 128-31; Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); Filártiga v. PenaIrala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
5

Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 147-48.

6

Although no court has explicitly held that a particular corporation was liable to a plaintiff in an
ATS suit, courts have consistently and deliberately left the possibility open for such claims if
brought under the right circumstances. I will discuss these cases in further detail later in this
article. See generally Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011);
Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2009) (court dismissed plaintiffs’ claim
on substantive grounds, but explicitly acknowledged that corporate defendants are subject to
liability under the ATS); Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008) (court
rejected defendant’s argument that corporate defendants were excluded from the ATS).
7

Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).

8

Id. at 239.
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was in a relationship with the government. 9 As the Kadic court instructs, certain
offenses are so heinous that no governmental relationship is necessary to impose
liability under the ATS.10
Secondary or assessorial liability, most commonly invoked under the aiding and
abetting doctrine, has been and remains an accepted method of bringing non-state
actors within the purview of the ATS, even in instances when the claim may not
otherwise entitle the plaintiff to relief from that particular defendant. Many
commentators claim that the bar for proving assessorial ATS violations has been
raised substantially in recent years.11 Nevertheless, liability under the aiding and
abetting doctrine is still an option for victims of human rights violations who can
successfully prove such violations were purposely instigated by corporations. 12 The
Kiobel court erroneously held that corporations, categorically, couldn’t be subject to
ATS suits because corporations are not subject to customary international law. The
Kiobel court’s holding was incorrect, however, because many courts have exercised
ATS jurisdiction over corporate defendants using the aiding and abetting doctrine.13
Prior to Kiobel, no U.S. court has ever held that corporations cannot be held
liable for violations of international norms. Although it is also true that no court has
ever actually found for the plaintiff in an ATS suit against a corporation, numerous
courts, both prior and subsequent to the Kiobel decision, have been presented with
the issue of corporate ATS liability. These courts have repeatedly acknowledged
that corporations may be held liable under the ATS under the right set of
circumstances.14 The Kiobel court went against the weight of authority and
effectively removed an established and effective means of recourse for victims of
offenses committed in violation of the law of nations. The Kiobel court deemphasized the significance of federal court decisions that demonstrate, under
various circumstances, that corporations may be held liable for ATS violations.
Because Kiobel removed corporate defendants from the scope of civil liability under
the ATS, and because a corporation is not a person who can be charged, convicted,

9

See generally Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 96 CIV. 8386 (KMW), 2002 WL
319887 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002) (court denies the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment where plaintiffs allege that two oil companies directed and aided the Nigerian
government in violating plaintiffs’ rights).
10
Kadic, 70 F.3d at 232.
11

Jonathan Drimmer & Michael Lieberman, Drimmer and Lieberman on Talisman Energy
and the Alien Tort Statute: The Continuing Threat of Secondary Liability, 2010 EMERGING
ISSUES 5182 (citing Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d at 260-64 (“[The Talisman court] held that
for a corporation to be liable under the ATS, plaintiffs must show the defendants purposely
acted to help the principal commit a human rights violation. A corporation’s mere
knowledge that its actions contributed to the principal’s commission of the offense, held the
court, is insufficient”)).
12

Id.

13
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 145; see generally Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d at 260-264; Khulumani
v. Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[In that] Circuit, a plaintiff
may plead a theory of aiding and abetting liability under the [ATS]”); Abdullahi v. Pfizer,
Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 188 (2d Cir. 2009) (court reversed the dismissal of the ATS suit because
the plaintiffs properly alleged that the drug company’s violations of international law were
done in concert with the Nigerian government).
14
See generally Romero, 552 F.3d 1303; Sinaltrainal, 578 F.3d 1252; Flomo, 643 F.3d
1013; Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d at 260-64; Pfizer, 562 F.3d at 188.

6
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and imprisoned for a crime, it effectively placed large multinational corporations
above the law.
In Part II of this article, I will provide a necessary overview of the history of the
ATS and its evolution into modern-day relevance. I will discuss the state of ATS
law as it pertains to corporations in Part III. Lastly, I will discuss the Kiobel decision
in detail, describe how the Second Circuit erred in its holding, and suggest that the
Supreme Court reverse the Kiobel decision on appeal in Part IV.
II. JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE:
FROM 1789 TO FILÁRTIGA AND BEYOND
A. Origin
The Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATS”) provides that “[t]he district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 15 The first Congress
passed the ATS as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789.16 Scholars have surmised that
the purpose of the ATS was to “ensure the young state’s full membership in the
international community” by ensuring the rights of foreign dignitaries. 17 The ATS
“guarantee[d] that foreign ambassadors [and] ships protected by international law
would have a cause of action in federal court for violations of [these] rights” 18
America’s founders understood that without this protection, the newly-formed
United States would not be welcomed and/or trusted in the “international
community” of sovereign nations. 19
Few cases were brought under the ATS from the time of its codification in 1789
until the 1980s. Only four judicial opinions were issued regarding the ATS in nearly
the first two centuries following the statute’s enactment.20 The first of these opinions
was recorded in 1795, where the United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina granted jurisdiction under the ATS in a dispute over the title of slaves
aboard a captured enemy vessel in Bolchos v. Darrel.21 After discussing the issue as
to whether the court had jurisdiction to hear the case, the District Court Judge
concluded: “[A]s the 9th section of the judiciary act of congress [Act Sept. 24, 1789,
1 Stat. 77] gives this court concurrent jurisdiction with the state courts and circuit

15

See generally ATS, supra note 1.

16

Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712. Because the Act was passed as part of the larger Judiciary Act of
1789, it does not have a name of its own. However, commentators and U.S. courts have
commonly referred to § 1350 the Alien Tort Claims Act or the Alien Tort Statute.
17

Gregory G.A. Tzeutschler, Corporate Violator: The Alien Tort Liability of Transnational
Corporations for Human Rights Abuses Abroad, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 359, 365
(1999).
18

Id.

19

Kelsy Deye, Can Corporations Be Held Liable Under the Alien Tort Claims Act?, 94 KY.
L.J. 649, 650-51 (2005-06).
20

Lucien J. Dhooge, A Modest Proposal to Amend the Alien Tort Statute to Provide
Guidance to Transnational Corporations, 13 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 119, 124
(2007).
21

Id.; Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795).
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courts of the United States where an alien sues for a tort, in violation of the law of
nations, or a treaty of the United States, I dismiss all doubt upon this point.” 22
In 1908, the Supreme Court of the United States discussed in O'Reilly De
Camara v. Brooke, the possible applicability of the ATS in a case where a U.S.
officer was accused of illegally seizing a Spanish woman’s property in a foreign
nation.23 In that case, the plaintiff alleged that she had the right by title to slaughter
cattle in a city-owned slaughterhouse and receive compensation for the same. This
title to slaughter cattle was incident to the office of Sheriff of Havana. When the
United States took power in Cuba and the Spanish sovereignty ended, the office of
the sheriff ended also. She argued that her rights were violated when, although the
office of the sheriff no longer existed, the Governor of Havana declared that the title
was and void and did not compensate the plaintiff and her family. The Court stated
in relevant part: “In any event, the question hardly can be avoided whether the
supported tort is ‘a tort only in violation of the law of nations' or of the treaty with
Spain.”24
In that case, the distinction between whether the alleged tort was done in
violation of the law of nations or of the treaty with Spain was significant, because
pursuant to a treaty entered into with Spain, the plaintiff would lose any claim
brought against a United States military official. 25 The United States Congress thus
removed the Plaintiff’s ability to sue the Governor for tort when it ratified the
Governor’s action. The plaintiff later argued that her rights, which were violated,
were so fundamental that it would be a violation of international law for them to be
displaced, even if the action was ratified by Congress. 26 The Court ultimately
dismissed the plaintiff’s claim because her contention that her fundamental rights
were violated was not the basis on which jurisdiction was asserted. 27 From the
opinion, an inference can be drawn that had the plaintiff alleged that the violation of
her rights constituted a violation of the law of nations, the Court would have to
exercise jurisdiction over the matter.
The next recorded judicial reference to the ATS did not come until 1961 in Adra
v. Clift, when the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland concluded that in a
custody dispute between two aliens, wrongfully withholding custody of a child
constituted an actionable tort.28 The court also found that using an illegal passport to
move the child away from her father constituted a violation of the law of nations. 29

22

Bolchos, 3 F. Cas. at 810 (emphasis added).

23

O'Reilly De Camara v. Brooke, 209 U.S. 45 (1908).

24

Id. at 51 (emphasis added).

25

Id. at 50.

26

Id. at 51.

27

Id.

28

Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 863-64 (D. Md. 1961).

29

Id. at 864-64.
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The court’s holding in this case was particularly significant because, as I will discuss
later in this article, it effectively expanded the scope of the ATS to encompass
private individuals and newly discovered violations of international law. 30
B. ATS Claims: A Modern Application
History shows that Congress only contemplated the ATS to extend to a “modest”
set of actions alleging violations of the law of nations. These were originally
contemplated as offences against ambassadors, violations of safe conduct, and
piracy.31 It was understood by eighteenth-century courts that violations of the law of
nations specifically referred to these types of actions. 32 However, after nearly two
hundred years of existence, the ATS received new life, and its scope expanded.
A 1980 decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
gave birth to an extensive, modern wave of ATS jurisprudence. 33 In the landmark
case of Filártiga v. Pena-Irala, the Second Circuit reversed a district court’s
dismissal of a wrongful death by torture complaint for want of subject-matter
jurisdiction.34 In Filártiga, the appellants brought an action alleging that the appellee
kidnapped, tortured, and killed their 17-year old relative in retaliation for his father’s
political actions and beliefs.35 The key issue in this case was the definition of the
law of nations. In finding that jurisdiction was proper under the “rarely invoked”
ATS, the court adopted an “evolving” standard of the law of nations. 36 The court
held that the appellee’s alleged conduct was committed under the color of
governmental authority and in violation of universally accepted norms of
international law, therefore subjecting the appellee to liability under the ATS. 37 The
Filártiga court recognized that over the course of centuries, new technology
emerges, relationships among sovereign nations change, and thus new conflicts arise.

30

In the last of these four pre “modern-era” ATS cases, decided in 1975, the Ninth Circuit
noted that injuries resulting from the evacuation of children from South Vietnam by the
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service could be addressed using the ATS. See
generally Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194 (9th Cir. 1975); Dhooge, supra note
20, at 171 n.4.
31

Sosa, 542 U.S. at 718-20. In this case, the first case in which the Supreme Court
addressed in detail the history and modern applicability of the ATS and how claims brought
under the statute were to be scrutinized, the Court took a historical approach to determining
Congress’ intent when the ATS was enacted. To date, this is the only Supreme Court
decision rendered with significant emphasis on the ATS. Because this decision is still the
chief authority on the issue of ATS liability, the historical inferences it made are
unanimously accepted and adopted by U.S. district and circuit courts.
32

Id. at 720.

33

Filártiga, 630 F.2d 876.

34

Id. at 890.

35

Id. at 878. Each of the appellants and the appellee were citizens of Paraguay.

36

Id. at 878, 879 n.3; Dhooge, supra note 20, at 124.

37

Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 878. “Under the color of official authority” for these purposes
refers to acts done by a state official.
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Furthermore, it must be inferred that Congress intended the ATS, like every other
statute, to have practical effect, and not be placed on the shelves of time and history
because of its uselessness.38 Thus, Filártiga moved the ATS jurisprudence out of the
box that historically limited its scope to the “modest” set of offenses that were
considered violations of the law of nations when the statute was enacted in 1789, by
declaring that the law of nations necessarily evolves as the times change. 39 This
“evolving” standard of what constitutes the law of nations was later recognized by
the Supreme Court, and has been adopted by all of the ATS cases to follow. 40 This
demonstrates that modern ATS jurisprudence is not restricted to recognizing the law
of nations as it existed in 1789 (at the time the ATS was enacted), but rather as it
evolves over time, giving credence to the idea that liability under the ATS should
extend to corporations.
“Modern application has provided some assistance in adjudicating claims under
the [ATS].”41 In determining what makes up the law of nations, courts “must
interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists
among the nations of the world today.” 42 Virtually all nations have renounced
official torture, but many agreements have placed a “universal condemnation” on
torture of any sort.43 Although torture wasn’t originally contemplated as an
international law violation when the ATS was enacted, it nonetheless violates
“established norms of the international law of human rights,” and hence modern-day
international law.44 In effect, the court found that the ATS allowed for adjudication
of modern customary international law violations, including human rights violations.
In 2004, the United States Supreme Court issued its only significant ATS
decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.45 In Sosa, a Mexican man filed suit in a U.S.
district court, alleging that the Drug Enforcement Administration had arranged his
arrest in Mexico for a criminal trial in the U.S., for which he was later acquitted. 46
The plaintiff further alleged that another Mexican person was involved in his
abduction and was therefore liable under the ATS for violating international law. 47

38

See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 719, 730.

39

See generally Filártiga, 630 F.2d 876.

40

See generally Sosa, 542 U.S. 692.
Sonia Jimenez, The Alien Tort Claims Act: A Tool for Repairing Ethically Challenged
U.S. Corporations, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 721, 734 (2004).
41

42

Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 881. The court relied on the United Nations Charter in determining
that the manner in which nations treat its own citizens is a matter of international concern.
USCS U.N. Charter art. 55. The Court quoted the relevant part of Art. 55 of the charter,
which provided: “[w]ith a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being
which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations . . . the United
Nations shall promote . . . universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions as to race, sex, language or religion. Id.
43

44

Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 880.
Id.

45

Sosa, 542 U.S. 692.

46

Id. at 698-99.

47

Id.

10
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The Court ultimately held, in relevant part, that the individual was not entitled to
damages under the ATS because his claim was not based on a valid international-law
norm.48 Furthermore, the Court established that the ATS grants jurisdiction for torts
committed in violation of international law, but does not create for plaintiffs a new
cause of action.49
The notion that ATS provides grounds for jurisdiction, but does not provide a
new cause of action purported by the Supreme Court in Sosa is essentially what the
controversy over corporate liability is based upon. The Kiobel court erroneously
likened corporate liability to a new cause of action, when corporate liability is
instead a jurisdictional issue, for which the ATS may be invoked according to Sosa.50
Essentially, plaintiffs in ATS actions must satisfy three fundamental elements:
plaintiff must “(1) be an alien, (2) claim a tort, (3) that violates a rule in a U.S. treaty
or customary international law that carries personal liability.” 51 Whether a claim is
actionable under the ATS “must be gauged against the current state of international
law, looking to those sources [courts] have long, albeit cautiously recognized.” 52
The Supreme Court has adopted the notion that the state of international law is ever
evolving, and courts must look to modern norms in adjudicating ATS cases. 53
While the elements of an ATS claim remain consistent, the Supreme Court has
imposed a heightened specificity requirement in determining whether a particular
norm constitutes international law.54 The Sosa test requires that claims based on the
present-day law of nations must “rest on a norm of international character accepted
by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of
the 18th-century paradigms [the Supreme Court has] recognized.”55 Although claims
alleging violations of the law of nations will be greeted with considerable scrutiny,
plaintiffs who can successfully prove that such actions violated a specifically defined
and widely accepted international norm will have their claims entertained by federal
courts.56

48

Id. at 734-35

49

Id. at 738.

50

See generally Kiobel, 621 F.3d 111.

51

Paul E. Hagen, Anthony L. Michaels, The Alien Tort Statute: A Primer on Liability for
Multinational Corporations, SK046 ALI-ABA 121, 125 (May 5-6, 2005). These elements
were derived directly from the text of § 1350, with the slight modification to Element 3.
This commentary purports to clarify what constitutes the law of nations in light of Sosa.
“The jurisdictional grant is best read as having been enacted on the understanding that the
common law would provide a cause of action for the modest number of international law
violations with a potential for personal liability at the time.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724.
52

Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733.

53

See generally id. (adopting Filártiga, 630 F.2d 876).

54

See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732-33.

55

Id. at 725 (this test requires that the international norm on which an alleged violation rests
must be as specifically defined and widely accepted as offences against ambassadors,
violations of safe conduct, and piracy were in 1789).
56

See id. at 714.
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III. THE GREAT DEBATE: CORPORATIONS MAY BE HELD LIABLE
UNDER THE ATS
A. Beginning of the ATS as Applied to Corporations
In the modern era of ATS litigation, courts have found themselves
increasingly involved in civil suits in which plaintiffs seek ATS relief from
corporations. In 1997, when a suit against a large U.S.-based oil company was filed
on behalf of 14 Burmese villagers under the ATS for alleged human rights
violations, a new way of attacking corporations was discovered. 57 In the landmark
case of Doe v. Unocal, the complaint alleged that the defendant corporation paid the
brutal Burmese military to provide security assistance for the construction of the
Yadana (gas) Pipeline project and thus entered into a joint venture with them. 58
Plaintiffs allege that the military committed multiple human rights violations
including forced labor, rape, torture and murder in connection with the pipeline
project.59 Plaintiffs claimed that Unocal was aware that these human rights
violations were being committed by the military and therefore was liable for these
violations.60
The U.S. District Court denied Unocal’s motion to dismiss, holding that because
plaintiffs allege that Unocal was jointly engaged with the state officials committing
the violations, subject-matter jurisdiction is proper under the ATS.61 The District
Court later dismissed the case on a motion for summary judgment, holding that
Plaintiffs failed to prove that Unocal engaged in state activity or controlled the
Burmese military.62 These claims were dismissed, not because the ATS didn’t
provide subject-matter jurisdiction over corporate defendants in general, but rather
because these plaintiffs failed to satisfy their burden of proof. 63 Unocal opened the
door for numerous future suits involving corporations by establishing that
corporations may be held liable under the ATS.

B. Individuals May Be Held Liable Under the ATS,
Therefore Corporations May Be Held Liable

57
See generally Mark D. Kielsgard, Unocal and the Demise of Corporate Neutrality, 36
CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 185 (2005) (sources vary as to the exact number of Burmese citizens
involved in the suit, ranging from 14 to 17); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D.
Cal. 1997) aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom; Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th
Cir. 2002) on reh'g en banc; Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).
58
59

Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 884-85.
Doe I, 395 F.3d at 939-40.

60

Katherine Gallagher, Civil Litigation and Transnational Business: An Alien Tort Statute
Primer, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 745, 750 (2010).
61

Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 891.

62

Doe I, 395 F.3d at 943-44 (on appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial
of the defendant-corporation’s motion to dismiss, and reversed summary judgment, holding
that the District Court placed too high a standard on the plaintiff’s claim, and remanded the
case for trial).
63

See id.

12
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Defendants in cases in which the ATS was invoked have argued that only
government agencies or officials, not individuals, may be subject to liability for
violations of the law of nations under the ATS. However, the Second Circuit
dispelled that argument in the 1995 case of Kadic v. Karadzic, which established that
non-state actors could be held liable for international law violations. 64 In Kadic,
Muslim and Croat citizens of Bosnia brought suit against the self-proclaimed
president of the republic of “Srpska” for rape, torture, forced prostitution, forced
pregnancy, and summary execution. 65 The plaintiffs claimed that all of these abuses
constituted genocide and war crimes in violation of the law of nations. 66 The Second
Circuit reversed the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York holding that “acts committed by non-state actors do not violate the law of
nations.”67 The court reasoned that the modern-era law of nations’ reach is not
confined to state action, fundamentally, because the probation against piracy is an
early example of the law of nations’ applicability to private individuals. 68 Most
importantly, the Second Circuit found that “certain forms of conduct violate the law
of nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as
private individuals.”69
The Kadic court reasoned that private individuals could be held liable for
violations of international law because certain specific types of abuses are so bad that
they are within the scope of the ATS, regardless of who committed them. 70 The
court found that genocide and war crimes do not require state action and individuals
may therefore be liable under the ATS for such offenses. 71 Although torture and
summary executions do require state action, private individuals may be held liable if
acting in concert with a state. 72 Thus, the Kadic court essentially set forth the criteria
under which private individuals may be held liable under the ATS. Private
individuals may be held liable (1) for commissions of war crimes and acts of

64

Kadic, 70 F.3d at 236-37.

65

Id. at 236.

66
67
68
69

70
71
72

Id.
Id.
Id. at 239.
Id.
See generally id.
Id.

See id. at 239, 241-45. The Second Circuit instructed that acts of genocide and war
crimes automatically warrant ATS jurisdiction, while other abuses may fall under ATS
jurisdiction if they were done in concert with some associated official action. Here, the
court opened the door for ATS liability (and inferably corporate liability) under the
important aider and abettor doctrine, which I discuss in further detail later in this article.
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genocide;73 and (2) for working the commission of other human rights abuses, if
done in concert with a state actor.74
ATS cases that address the issue of whether private individuals may be found
liable for human rights violations, such as Kadic and cases that follow, unanimously
conclude that the courts may exercise jurisdiction in these scenarios. 75 The Kadic
court did not base its holding, which has become universally accepted in the U.S., on
any express term in the statute or International tribunal. Rather, it found that certain
acts constituted violations of the law of nations and therefore subjected its actors
(regardless of whether they were state or private individuals) to liability under the
ATS.76 Applying this rationale, the criteria under which private individuals may be
subject to ATS liability must include corporations as well.
In the recent Seventh Circuit decision in Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber
Co., the court relied in part on Kadic to determine that the law of nations obliged the
court to decide how to enforce the substantive obligations imposed by international
law.77 The Flomo plaintiffs brought an ATS suit against the Firestone, alleging that
the defendant utilized “hazardous child labor” on its 118,000-acre rubber plantation
in Liberia.78 The plaintiffs alleged that the use of such labor practices violated the
law of nations. The court ultimately concluded that the record was not sufficient to
infer a violation of international law and therefore dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims. 79
The court nevertheless held, in relevant part, that corporations may be held liable
under the ATS.80
In Kadic the significance of the court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the private
individual simply lies in that it was the first time a U.S. court exercised jurisdiction
over any defendant other than a state actor. There was nothing in the decision that
distinguished private individuals from corporations in any way, except for the
reference to piracy as an originally contemplated norm for which the ATS was
enacted, and a case that reflected this norm. 81 However, in 1789, large multinational
corporations did not exist as they commonly do today. If they had existed, and a
case was brought against such a corporation, the courts of the day may very well
have ruled in a similar fashion against it. Furthermore, there has never been any
distinction between an “aider and abettor” and a corporation. To the contrary, the
Second Circuit establishes the standard for aiding and abetting in an ATS case that
involved a corporate defendant, thus making the Kiobel court’s holding that

73

Id. at 239.

74

Id. at 245.

75

See generally Kiobel, 621 F.3d 111; Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d 244; Pfizer, 562 F.3d
163; Khulumani, 504 F.3d 254; Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d. 233 (2d
Cir. 2003).
76

Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239.

77

Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1020.

78

Id. at 1015.
Id. at 1023-24.

79
80

Id. at 1021, 1025 (“Having satisfied ourselves that corporate liability is possible under the
[ATS] . . . .”).
81

Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239.

14

48

IN THE BALANCE

[Vol. 1:37

corporations are not subject to international law one that is contradictory to accepted
precedent set in the very same circuit and without meaningful precedent.
C. Corporations May be Held Liable under the Aiding and Abetting Doctrine
It is clear from case law precedent that ATS liability under the aiding and
abetting doctrine extends to corporate defendants. Although the exact standard by
which parties may be found liable in ATS cases under the aiding and abetting
doctrine is not clear, courts have generally found that corporations may be held liable
for aiding and abetting international law violations. 82 The concept of aiding and
abetting liability is critical in the ATS context, because in order for the ATS to
provide jurisdiction, the defendant must have allegedly committed a violation of
international law.83 Except under extreme circumstances, only government officials
could commit violations of the law of nations. 84 For that reason, unless a private
individual or corporation embarks upon genocide or committing war crimes, no
violation of international law could be found. The aiding and abetting doctrine is
thus an integral arm of the ATS in that it brings private parties that act in concert
with the government within the scope of liability.
The differing standards by which courts are to consider whether a corporation
may be held liable under the aider and abettor doctrine are set forth in two Second
Circuit cases. In Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank, Ltd., a group of plaintiffs brought
suit against numerous corporate defendants under the ATS, alleging that the
defendants “actively and willingly collaborated with the government of South
Africa”85 in maintaining Apartheid, the racially-based system of repression that
benefited South Africa’s minority White population, while restricting the majority
Black population “in all areas of life.” 86 The Second Circuit overturned a district
court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ ATS claims, holding that the district court erred in
finding that ATS jurisdiction could not be based on aiding and abetting international
law violations.87
In his concurring opinion of Khulumani, Judge Katzmann first cautions against
confusing the cause of action inquiry set forth in Sosa v. Alvarez-Mcain with the
jurisdictional analysis under the ATS.88 Judge Katzmann also found that the concept
of aiding and abetting liability is “well established” international criminal law

82

Gallagher, supra note 60, at 750.

83

See generally ATS, supra note 1.

84

See generally, Kadic, 70 F.3d 232.

85

Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 258.

86

Id. at 260.

87

Id. See In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).

88

Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 264. Judge Katzmann, in criticizing the district court’s dismissal
of plaintiff’s claims, stated that: “[the district court’s analysis] conflated the jurisdictional
and cause of action analyses required by the ATCA. As a result, the district court
mistakenly incorporated a discretionary analysis into the determination of whether it has
jurisdiction under the ATCA. Second, it erroneously held that aiding and abetting liability
does not exist under international law.”
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tribunals, and that international law provides the primary source for determining the
scope of liability.89 Thus, who should be held liable under the aider and abettor
theory should be governed by international law, the standard being “substantial
assistance.”90 Judge Katzmann concluded that aider and abettor liability was so
“well established and universally recognized to be considered customary
international law for purposes of the [ATS],”91 and that a defendant may be held
liable when the defendant “(1) provides practical assistance to the principal which
has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime, and (2) does so with the
purpose of facilitating the commission of that crime.” 92
Judge Hall also gave a concurring opinion in Khulumani, in which he, like Judge
Katzmann, recognized that the courts should look to international law to define
primary liability under the ATS.93 However, Judge Hall found that the courts should
look to federal common law in defining a standard by which defendants may be held
liable under an aider and abettor theory. 94 Judge Hall defined aiding and abetting as
“knowingly and substantially assisting the commission of a violation of customary
international law.”95 Unlike Judge Katzmann’s standard, this does not require that
89

Id. at 270-72. Aider and abettor liability has long been recognized in numerous
international treaties, including the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the
statutes creating the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”)
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”). Specifically, the London
Charter, which established the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg following the
second World War extended individual liability for aiding and abetting war crimes,
specifically stating that “accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a
common plan or conspiracy to commit” any of the crimes triable by the Tribunal would be
held responsible. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis, art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, E.A.S. 472.
90

Id. at 270, 277. Equally applicable to the question of whether international law extends
liability to non-state actors is where to look to determine whether the scope of liability for a
violation of international law should extend to aiders and abettors. “[W]hether a norm is
sufficiently definite to support a cause of action” raises a “related consideration [of]
whether international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the
perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or
individual.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732, n. 20.
91

See Kadic, 70 F.3d 232.

92

Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 277 (emphasis added; internal quotations omitted). It is
important to note that under Judge Katzmann’s standard, mere knowledge that the
assistance given to the principle furthered the commission of a violation of an international
norm is not sufficient to invoke liability under the ATS.
93

Id. at 286-87.

94

Id. at 284. This differs substantially from Judge Katzmann’s conclusion that international
law should be the source for determining both what violations invoke primary liability
under the ATS (against the actual perpetrator), as well as the standard by which accessorial
liability may be imposed (against the aider and abettor).
95

Id. at 287-89; Gallagher, supra note 60, at 763 (emphasis added). Judge Hall adopts the
holding in Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983), which stated the elements
of aiding and abetting: “(1) the party whom the defendant aids must perform a wrongful act
that causes an injury; (2) the defendant must be generally aware of his role as part of an
overall illegal or tortious activity at the time that he provides the assistance; [and] (3) the
defendant must knowingly and substantially assist the principal violation.” Halberstam,
705 F.2d, at 477.
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the defendant’s purpose was to assist the violation. Knowledge that the assistance
the defendant provided to the principal was being used to aid in the commission of
an international law violation is sufficient to hold the defendant liable under this
view. Conversely, Judge Katzmann’s standard imposes a heightened mens rea
requirement, in that the assistance provided to the principal must have been “with the
purpose of facilitating the commission of that crime.” 96 Under Judge Katzmann’s
view, it must be the intent of the aiding party to facilitate the wrongdoing for aiding
and abetting liability to be imposed, whereas Judge Hall merely requires
awareness.97
In Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, the Second Circuit
recognized that plaintiffs could seek relief for violations of international norms under
the aider and abettor doctrine, but that the court was split as to what the standard for
pleading such liability was or should be.98 Talisman Energy Co. was a Canadian
energy company that participated in a consortium with three other oil companies and
the Sudanese government for the exploration, production, and development of oil in
Sudan in the 1990’s and early 2000’s. 99 Together, the Sudanese government and
consortium built all-weather roads to and from the oil concession areas, and
upgraded two airstrips, which were used exclusively by the military. 100 The
Sudanese military and government-sponsored militias provided security for the
companies’ oil operations.101 In the process of “securing” the oil concessions, the
security forces displaced, assaulted, and shot at civilians who lived in nearby
villages, and bombed them regularly. 102 The plaintiffs in this case alleged that
Talisman aided and abetted the Sudanese government in violating customary
international law.103
For the purpose of creating binding legal precedent and to dispose the confusion
that necessarily arose out of the panel split in Khulumani, the Talisman court adopted
the standard for aider and abettor liability set forth in Judge Katzmann’s concurrence
as the law of the Second Circuit.104 The court recognized that Talisman knowingly

96
97
98

99

Gallagher, supra note 60, at 763.
Id.
Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d at 258.
Id.

100

Id. at 249.

101

Id. at 249-50.

102
103

Id.
Id. at 251.

104
Id. The court recognized that although Judges Katzmann and Korman agreed that “the
standard for aiding and abetting liability under the ATS must derive from international law
sources” in the judges’ concurrence and dissent respectively, Judge Katzmann’s concurring
opinion nevertheless did not constitute a holding and is therefore not binding precedent.
See Gallagher, supra note 60, at 765.
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and substantially assisted the Sudanese government.105 Nevertheless, the court
ultimately dismissed the claims because the plaintiffs could not show that Talisman
purposefully aided the government in committing any of the human rights
violations.106 Relying on international law as the source of the standard for aiding
and abetting liability, the Talisman court held that defendants who purposefully aid
and abet a violation of international law may be held liable under the ATS. 107
As noted above, the Talisman court held that ATS liability could be imposed if
the plaintiffs could prove the elements of aiding and abetting, and clarified the
standard for liability under the aiding and abetting doctrine was made law, in the
context of a corporate defendant. Yet, in Kiobel, the Second Circuit distinguishes
corporate liability and aiding and abetting liability as two separate jurisdictional
categories.108 In relying on precedent that establishes that corporations may be held
liable for ATS violations through the aider and abettor doctrine, while at the same
time holding that there can be no corporate liability under the ATS, the Kiobel court
creates an inconsistency within the jurisprudence of the Second Circuit and others,
which removes the ability of legal professionals to accurately identify what the state
of the law is.
D. Neither the Text of the ATS, or U.S. Common Law
Make Corporations Per-Se Immune from Liability
The text of the ATS places no limitation as to who may be brought as a defendant
under the ATS, therefore placing no prohibition on corporations being subject to
liability under the ATS.109 In Romero v. Drummond Co., the Eleventh Circuit
expressly rejected a corporate-defendant’s argument that the ATS doesn’t allow suits
against corporations.110 In Romero, a Columbian labor union and relatives of
deceased union workers brought suit against the Columbian subsidiary of a U.S. coal
mining company.111 The complaint alleged that executives of the defendantcorporation recruited paramilitary forces to torture and murder union leaders. 112 The
court held, in relevant part, that the ATS contains no express exceptions for
corporations, and therefore “grants jurisdiction from complaints of torture against
corporate defendants.”113
U.S. ATS jurisprudence has long recognized that corporations are capable of
committing substantial human rights violations and should therefore be held liable
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Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d at 262-63.

106

Id. at 261-62.

107

Id. at 259.

108

Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 129.

109

See generally ATS, supra note 1.
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Romero, 552 F.3d 1303.

111

Id. at 1309.
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Id.
Id. at 1315.
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for those violations. In 1907, The U.S. Attorney General rendered an opinion in a
matter involving a U.S. corporation and Mexican nationals. 114 The Attorney General
stated that the corporation could be held liable if its actions injured “the substantial
rights of citizens of Mexico under the principles of international law or by treaty.” 115
More recently, in the case of Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., the Second Circuit held that a
prohibition on nonconsensual medical experimentation on human beings constituted
a universally accepted norm of customary international law, and consequently the
alleged violation committed by the defendant corporation thereof fell within purview
of the ATS.116 Furthermore, in Talisman, the Second Circuit adopted a standard
under which corporations may be held liable under the ATS. 117 Although the court
held that mere knowledge that a corporation’s actions contributed to the commission
of a human rights violation is insufficient, it nevertheless found that corporations
may be held liable if the plaintiffs can demonstrate that the corporation purposefully
had such an involvement.118
Those in opposition to corporate liability under the ATS have cited no authority
that states that corporations are per se immune or exempt from liability under the
ATS.119 As pointed out by Judge Leval in his concurring opinion in Kiobel: “[n]o
court has ever dismissed a civil suit against a corporation, which alleged a violation
of the laws of nations, on the ground that juridical entities [such as corporations]
have no legal responsibility or liability under that law.” 120 Many corporatedefendants that have found themselves on the defending end of ATS litigation have
successfully had the claims brought against them dismissed. However, with the
exception of the defendant-corporation in Kiobel, none of these corporations
received these favorable rulings solely because their existence as corporations made
them immune from ATS liability or international law. Conversely, numerous ATS
cases involving corporate defendants were dismissed because the plaintiffs either
failed to properly state their clams, or failed prove that the corporation actually
violated a law of nations.121
In holding that corporations are not subject to international law and therefore
cannot be held liable under the ATS, the Kiobel court relied on no positive authority
which supported such a conclusion. Instead, the court looked past U.S. ATS cases
that impliedly suggest, if not expressly state, that corporations can be held liable
under the ATS, if the necessary elements are satisfied in the plaintiffs’ pleadings.
The accepted interpretation as to what the drafters of the Act contemplated is of what
types of actions may be brought under the ATS and whom the Act was intended to
114

115

116

Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 162.
Id.
Pfizer, 562 F.3d at 188.

117
See generally Drimmer & Lieberman, supra note 11; see generally Talisman Energy,
582 F.3d at 260-64 (In a case involving numerous corporate defendants, the court adopts
Judge Katzmann’s concurring opinion in Khulumani, which set the standard by which
defendants in ATS suits may be held liable under the aider and abettor doctrine);
Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 287-89.
118

119

120

121

Id.
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 160, 161.
Id.

See Romero, 552 F.3d 1303; Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d 244; Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh
Produce, 416 F.3d 1242, 1247 (11th Cir. 2005); Flores, 414 F.3d. 233.
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protect.122 Nothing in the ATS or any of the early cases demonstrates that the
drafters or early courts intended for the scope of the ATS to extend to government
officials as well as private individuals, but not corporations. Although there have
been few, if any, outright victories for plaintiffs who bring suits against corporations
under the ATS, courts have clearly indicated that they intend for the possibility of
corporate liability to remain open.
IV. THE KIOBEL CASE
A. Background
In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the plaintiffs, who were residents
of Nigeria, brought suit against three oil companies, alleging that the companies
aided and abetted the Nigerian government in committing human rights abuses. 123
The plaintiffs claimed that these abuses violated the law of nations. 124 The plaintiffs
claimed that Nigerian military forces shot and killed, beat, raped, and arrested
members of their village. 125 The plaintiffs also claimed that the military forces
destroyed and looted their property.126 The plaintiffs alleged that the corporate
defendants aided the abuse by providing transportation to the forces, allowed the
forces to utilize their property to stage attacks, and compensated soldiers for the
attacks.127 The Second Circuit did not decide whether these defendants were liable
under the aiding and abetting doctrine, because it found that corporate defendants
were categorically excluded from liability under international law. 128 The court
ultimately dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims because the ATS did not provide
jurisdiction over the corporate defendants. 129
The majority opinion in Kiobel simply and directly held that federal courts had no
jurisdiction over corporations under the ATS. 130 The Second Circuit identified that it
had looked to international law in determining that government officials, private
individuals, and aiders and abettors can be held liable under the ATS, and that a
similar inquiry ought to be performed to determine whether corporations can be held
liable.131 This court first looked to international criminal tribunals, particularly the
post-World War II Nuremburg Tribunal proceedings to determine what the state of
international law was pertaining to corporations. 132 The court specifically identified
what is commonly referred to as the “Farben Case,” where the International Military
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See Sosa, 542 U.S. 692.
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Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 117.

124

Id. at 123.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
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Id. at 149.
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Id. at 147.

130

Id. at 145.
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Id. at 130.

132

Id. at 132.
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Tribunal charged twenty-four of I.G. Farben’s executives with various war crimes,
but did not “charge” the corporate entity. 133 Furthermore, although the court did
properly acknowledge that treaties are a proper source for determining the state of
international law, and many of them impose liability on corporations, it nevertheless
held that such treaties do not create a customary international norm that establishes
that corporations are subject to international law. 134
B. Where the Kiobel Court Went Wrong
The Kiobel opinion was wrong on three main fronts. First, the court
acknowledged that private parties can be liable for violations of international law
under the aiding and abetting doctrine, but concluded that corporations could not. 135
Any party aiding and abetting a violation of human rights must fundamentally be
either a private individual or corporation.136 The case law that the Kiobel court
accepts and cites to as precedent necessarily establishes that corporations may be
liable under the theory of aiding and abetting, because the court specifically set forth
the criteria under which the corporate defendant could be held liable under the
ATS.137 Although the court purported to agree with the holding in Talisman and
Judge Katzmann’s concurrence in Khulumani, the Kiobel court failed to
acknowledge the context in which these cases were heard. Both Talisman and
Khulumani were cases in which plaintiffs brought claims against corporate
defendants under the ATS.138 In endorsing the standard for aider and abettor liability
set forth in Talisman, while at the same time holding that there can be no liability
imposed against corporate defendants in ATS cases, the Kiobel majority opinion
created a legal contradiction that should be reconciled.
The Kiobel opinion referenced cases in which determinations were made as to
whether particular classes of defendants may be held liable under the ATS. 139 The
rationale in Kiobel reflects a view that “aiders and abettors” are a type of people or
entity, such as government actors, private individuals, and corporations. The court
stated that: “[w]e have looked to international law to determine whether state
officials . . . private individuals . . . and aiders and abettors . . . can be held liable
133

Id. at 135-36. I.G. Farben was the German chemical conglomerate that was alleged to
have substantially assisted Nazi Germany in the development of chemical weaponry during
World War II.
134

Id. at 137-39.

135

See id. at 149.

136

State officials, or individuals acting “under the color of official authority,” are
established defendants under the ATS, and therefore aiding and abetting liability will not
come into play in suits brought against them. See generally Filártiga, 630 F.2d 876.

137
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 129 (acknowledging Judge Katzmann’s concurring opinion in
Khulumani as the law of the Second Circuit, and proper mechanism for analyzing ATS
claims under the aiding and abetting doctrine). See generally Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d at
258 (adopting Judge Katzmann’s analysis in his Khulumani concurrence and finding that
corporations may be subject to ATS liability upon the plaintiffs’ successful demonstration
that the corporation provided practical assistance that has a substantial effect on the
perpetration of a crime, with the purpose of facilitating that crime).
138
Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d 244; Khulumani, 504 F.3d 254 (plaintiffs bringng ATS suit
against numerous corporate defendants for assisting and furthering apartheid in South
Africa).
139

Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 129.
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under the ATS.”140 However, in doing so, the court misapplied the analysis set forth
in those cases and drew a conclusion that was hardly supported by the opinions of
either of the foregoing cases.
Second, the court acknowledged that private individuals could be held liable
under the ATS, but failed to apply the reasoning upon which that determination was
based.141 The Kiobel court acknowledged the precedent set by Kadic, but
disregarded the manner in which the Kadic court arrived at its conclusion. 142 The
Kiobel court stated that international tribunals have never exercised jurisdiction over
corporations, therefore corporate liability has not risen to the level of an international
norm.143 It is true that U.S. courts have looked to international criminal law to help
show which norms have “definite content” and “widespread acceptance” to
constitute what actions violate the law of nations. 144 However, while also
recognizing treaties as a source for determining international law, the court placed
little significance on the many treaties that impose obligations on corporations. 145
As Judge Leval stated in his concurring opinion, international tribunals have
never imposed any civil liability over any sort of private actor.146 It is therefore a
premature conclusion that corporations are, generally, not subject to international
law, especially in light of the existence of treaties that impose specific obligations on
corporations. The Kiobel court bases its decision largely on the Nuremburg
Tribunals, which took place before the doctrine of aiding and abetting liability was
established.147 It is universally recognized that courts must rely on international law
as it has evolved in making determinations of jurisdiction under the ATS.148
Lastly, the court erred in finding that corporations, as a general rule, were not
subject to international law. The court stated that corporations couldn’t be held
liable under the ATS because corporate liability does not constitute an international
norm.149 Such an argument presents a noteworthy gap in logic because it compares
corporate liability to established international laws, which prohibit “genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity.” 150 Corporate liability is not and cannot be a
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Id. at 130.

141

Id. at 129; see generally Kadic, 70 F.3d 232 (imposing ATS liability to private
individuals because certain violations of international law are so heinous, that the defendant
may be liable, although the defendant was not a public official).
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Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 130.

143

Id. at 135.
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Gallagher, supra note 60, at 748.
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Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 139.
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Id. at 160 n.11.
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The Nuremberg Tribunals followed WWII. Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d 244, although
not the first case to discuss the doctrine, set the standard for aiding and abetting liability was
decided in 2009.
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See generally Sosa, 542 U.S. 692 (following Filártiga, 630 F.2d 876).
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Id. at 4145-6.
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See Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d at 257 n. 7.
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“norm” in the sense that it is not conduct. Violations of international law norms are
actionable in courts. How is “corporate liability” to be violated? Corporate liability
is merely a term attached to holding corporations accountable in court for their
violations of international law norms. Furthermore, the opinions from which the
Kiobel court drew did not turn on whether liability for a particular group of actors
constituted a “norm.” Rather, these cases considered whether a class of defendants
could be found liable for violating an international law norm.151
How could the Second Circuit rely on these cases for the substantive aiding and
abetting standard for ATS liability, yet ignore the fact that every one of those cases
involved corporate defendants, and ultimately find that corporations cannot be held
liable under the ATS? The Kiobel court reasoned that a footnote in the Sosa opinion
instructed courts to look at international law to determine whether international law
extended the scope of liability of a violation to the perpetrator being sued if the
defendant is a private individual or corporation. 152 Even though the Kiobel court
inquired whether international law extended the scope of liability to corporations,
and somehow managed to exclude corporate defendants from liability under the
aiding and abetting doctrine, it nonetheless erred in finding that corporations are not
subject to international law.153
After World War II, “the allied powers dissolved German corporations that had
assisted the Nazi war effort,” and did so under the authority of customary
international law.154 Additionally, all the assets of I.G. Farben were seized by the
allied powers when the company was found to have “knowingly and prominently
engaged in building up and maintaining the German war potential.” 155 Corporations
cannot be thrown in jail, nor can individual officers be held civilly liable for the
actions of all of its employees. However, the fact that the allied powers dissolved
this corporation and made some of its assets available for reparations, under the
authority of international law, for the corporation’s assistance to the German war
effort clearly demonstrates corporations are indeed subject to international law.
Because corporations are subject to international law, the entire U.S. aiding and
abetting jurisprudence as relates to the ATS involves corporate defendants, the law
of nations is ever evolving, and no court prior to or since Kiobel has held that
corporations, categorically, are excluded from ATS liability, the Kiobel court simply
got it wrong.
V. CONCLUSION
It has been said that broad liability under the ATS could open the door for many
frivolous lawsuits and consequently stifle investment and competition of U.S.
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Filártiga, 630 F.2d 876; Kadic, 70 F.3d 232; Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d 244.
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Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 127 (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n. 20).
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Id. at 148.
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Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1017 (citing Control Council Law No. 2, Providing for the
Termination and Liquidation of the Nazi Organizations (Oct. 10, 1945), reprinted in 1
Enactments and Approved Papers of the Control Council and Coordinating Committee 131
(1945) (it is particularly significant that some of these assets were made available for
reparations), www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_ Law/enactments-home.html (last visited Jan. 22,
2012).
155
Id. (citing Control Council Law No. 9, Providing for the Seizure of Property Owned by
I.G. Farbenindustrie and the Control Thereof (Nov. 30, 1945), reprinted in 1 Enactments
and Approved Papers of the Control Council and Coordinating Committee 225 (1945),
www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_ Law/enactments-home.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2012).
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multinational corporations abroad.156 It has also been said that corporations
operating abroad will not know what behavior is acceptable under international law,
and cause even more confusion under the ATS. In reality, courts have been very
strict in limiting the reach of the ATS to allegations of very specific human rights
violations. Furthermore, courts have demonstrated that it is extremely difficult for a
plaintiff to win an ATS case on the merits because such an outcome has yet to be
reached. However, courts have been equally careful to ensure that meritous claims
brought against corporations under the ATS are heard.
If the Second Circuit is permitted to ban corporate liability under the ATS,
it would do so going against the greater weight of authority which demonstrates that
corporations are not exempt from liability under the ATS, and eliminate a
meaningful check on how corporations conduct business overseas. Although there
have been no outright victories for plaintiffs in ATS cases against corporate
defendants, there have been numerous instances in which courts have refused to rule
out the possibility of corporate ATS liability. Furthermore, there have been a
number of major cases that have settled outside of court, even on the eve of trial,
after multiple failed attempts by the defendant corporation to have plaintiffs’ ATS
claims dismissed.157 This demonstrates that corporations are fearful of what the
outcome of trial could be and would rather not risk such a loss. Without the
possibility of liability, corporations will have no incentive to settle ATS cases, and
victims of terrible human rights violations will potentially be left without any
redress, simply because the actor was a powerful corporation and not a government
officer or another private individual. Furthermore, if this is permitted to remain
positive law, corporations will be encouraged to engage in whatever conduct that
might have a positive impact on its business, regardless of whether its conduct
furthers violations of individuals’ fundamental rights.
Prior to its holding in Kiobel, the law of the Second Circuit was that Corporations
could be held liable under the ATS for purposely aiding and abetting human rights
violations. However, while acknowledging that precedent purporting to uphold it,
the Kiobel court held that corporations could not be held liable under the ATS. 158
This holding comes in direct contrast to the precedent set in Talisman.159
U.S. corporations, attorneys, judges, students, and scholars are all in need of a
conclusive, authoritative statement of what the law is. All circuit courts of appeals
presented with the issue of corporate liability under the ATS have held that
corporations may be found liable when certain specific criteria are met. The
Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case of Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc. less than a
month after the Second Circuit issued its Kiobel decision. This indicates that the
Court intends for corporate liability under the ATS to remain a possibility. 160 The
U.S. Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in the Kiobel case, apparently
recognizing the need for clarity among the circuit courts. 161 The Supreme Court
\
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should reverse the Kiobel holding that corporations may not be held liable under the
ATS, and provide much needed and long awaited clarity on the issue.

